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Summary 
This thesis assesses two relatively new rule of law tools of two regional 
organisations in Europe – the European Union with the new EU Framework 
for strengthening the rule of law, and the Venice Commission with a new rule 
of law checklist, and puts them in relation with a concrete case. The rule of 
law is a principle worth safeguarding at any time, but its relevance increases 
as it is being questioned and threatened. Regional organisations provide 
expertise that is somewhat detached from national political discourses, and 
has a higher chance of addressing national rule of law issues in an unbiased 
way. The rule of law is commonly referred to, but it is seldom defined. 
Therefore, the first section of this thesis is devoted to giving conceptual 
meaning and historical context to the rule of law. The following two sections 
addresses how the rule of law is defined in each organisation, and in relation 
with two recent tools for combating rule of law threats. The fourth section 
demonstrates how the European Union and the Council of Europe (foremost 
via the Venice Commission) are implementing these tools in a concrete case 
- the Polish Constitutional crisis. With best practices identified, the fifth and 
last section is a proposal on how to build a step forward. In this thesis, it will 
become clear that the European Union and the Council of Europe conceives 
the rule of law as a substantive concept and part of a bigger ‘package’ together 
with democracy and human rights.  
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Sammanfattning 
Syftet med denna uppsats är att analysera och kontrastera två nya verktyg från 
EU och Europarådets Venedigkommission ämnade att bekämpa hot mot 
rättsstatsprincipen i Europa. Framförallt behandlar uppsatsen innehållet i 
Venedigkommissionens checklista för rättsstatsprincipen, samt EU:s nya 
ramverk för att förstärka rättsstatsprincipen. Idag ifrågasätts allt mer 
internationella organisationers arbete för rättsstatsprincipen liksom principen 
som sådan. Regionala organisationer bidrar med expertis som är någorlunda 
frånkopplad nationella politiska diskurser, och har därför högre chans att 
adressera problemen på ett objektivt sätt. Rättsstatsprincipen är en vanlig 
princip att åberopa, men som sällan blir definierad. Uppsatsens första del är 
därför ägnad till att ge en konceptuell grund och historisk kontext till 
rättsstatsprincipen. De följande två delarna beskriver hur rättsstatsprincipen 
definieras i respektive organisation, och ställer det i relation till de nyaste 
verktygen för att bekämpa hot mot samma princip. Den fjärde delen 
framställer hur EU och Europarådet (främst via Venedigkommissionen) 
implementerar dessa verktyg i ett konkret fall – den ’konstitutionella krisen’ 
i Polen. Delen presenterar även vad som anses vara ’bästa praxis’, och ligger 
till grund för det avslutande kapitlet, som innehåller ett antal förslag på 
fortsatt utveckling. I denna uppsats kommer det bli tydligt att EU och 
Europarådet ser rättsstatsprincipen som en substantiell princip och en del av 
ett större ’paket’ tillsammans med demokrati och mänskliga rättigheter. 
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Abbreviations 
CoE  Council of Europe 
ECHR Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (commonly referred 
to as the European Convention on Human 
Rights) 
ECtHR  European Court of Human Rights 
EC  European Commission 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
EU  European Union 
EU FRA  European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
EP  European Parliament 
ICJ  International Court of Justice 
NGO Non-governmental organisation  
ODIHR OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe  
VC  European Commission for Democracy through 
Law (commonly referred to as the Venice 
Commission) 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine what the rule of law entails today for 
the two most important regional organisations in Europe. To contextualise 
this, a brief historical account of the development of this concept is presented, 
since the regional organisations refer to legal scholars and philosophers to 
legitimise their current understanding of the rule of law. The purpose is to 
investigate the current understanding of the rule of law, which is why two 
relatively new tools have been chosen to exemplify this. It will in this thesis 
also be analysed whether potential cross-fertilisation takes place between the 
European Union (henceforth EU) and the Council of Europe (henceforth 
CoE), in their work to strengthen the rule of law. The Polish Constitutional 
crisis was chosen to serve as a concrete case. Given the purpose of this thesis, 
the research question is: How successful are the current tools in the EU and 
the CoE for combating rule of law threats in their member states? 
In order to answer the research question, these sub-questions will be 
addressed: 
- How do the EU and the CoE define the rule of law? 
- What are the new tools for combating rule of law threats in Europe?  
- In what way does potential cross-fertilisation or mutual enforcement 
between the EU and the CoE take place? 
 
1.2 Method and Theory 
The theoretical framework is a section that serves to enhance the 
understanding of the sometimes vague definitions in binding legal sources. 
The history of the term the ‘rule of law’ is presented to facilitate and 
contextualise how the ‘rule of law’ is used today in Europe’s regional 
organisations. The theoretical framework is particularly relevant in relation 
with the two sections following it, but bears an importance for case study on 
Poland as well. By gaining knowledge on what the rule of law have developed 
to include historically, particularly on constitutional matters, it is 
understandable why the EU and the CoE puts so much emphasis on these 
matters when they act in relation to a concrete case. The conclusions in the 
final chapter is built on an analysis on the working methods of the EU and the 
CoE, but is facilitated by the theoretical framework. 
This thesis concerns mostly the law of international organisations, and 
to some extent international law. The majority of sources are soft law1, and 
documents enacted by international organisations, which is why this thesis 
                                                
1 Soft law can be defined as “normative provisions contained in non-binding texts”. Cf 
Shelton, Dinah, p. 292 ed. Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms 
in the International Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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only partly has a legal dogmatic method.2 When binding legal sources are 
presented, they serve to answer the research question, which is to analyse the 
words used in a binding legal source, most importantly the ‘rule of law’. Soft 
law and the history of legal philosophy are used when they serve to interpret 
binding international law, in this particular case what is meant by the ‘rule of 
law’ today.  
Sources of international law are often equated with article 38 of the ICJ 
statute and are (1) international conventions, (2) international custom, (3) 
general principles, (4) judicial decisions and (5) doctrine.3 This thesis focuses 
particularly on international conventions and doctrine. The goal has not been 
to interpret what the rule of law means from the authors point of view, using 
international principles of treaty interpretation set forth most importantly in 
articles 31-33 VCLT4, but rather to ‘enter the mind’ of those organisations 
that work practically with rule of law enforcement, using soft law 
instruments.  
This thesis does not employ any specific theory of application. It 
concerns a theory/concept whose meaning is arguably contested. The scope 
of this thesis is to discuss this concept (the rule of law) with no determined 
way of application, to draw some conclusion as to what are some current 
understandings of its nature. No stance has been taken by the author on 
beforehand regarding the definition of the rule of law, nor is it the purpose. 
The conceptual and historical chapter does offer a broad arrange of theories, 
all of which discuss the nature of the rule of law in some sense. Therefore, it 
will not be repeated in this section. Lastly, it should be added that the 
perception of the author is that the rule of law entails something positive, and 
worth safeguarding.5 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
The rule of law will only be discussed in a European context. This means that 
only a European/Western theoretical approach is considered, when presenting 
the various philosophical theories concerning the rule of law. The term ‘rule 
of law’ has in itself other potential meanings in other languages, which is also 
something that will not be accounted for in this thesis. However, when 
                                                
2 A legal dogmatic method is about analysing the sources of law, to discern and fully 
understand its legal content.  See Sandgren, Claes (2015). Rättsvetenskap för 
uppsatsförfattare: ämne, material, metod och argumentation. Third Edition. Stockholm: 
Norstedts juridik. pp. 43-44. 
3 Statute of the International Court of Justice, New York 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171. 
4 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331.  
5 Perhaps it is easiest to express why the rule of law is something positive when trying to 
imagine a state with a failed rule of law situation. This hypothetical state will most likely 
not provide effective means for the judiciary, and ensure that the justice system works in an 
equal way. The state would most likely be more corrupt as well. If the rule of law is viewed 
as being interconnected with human rights and democracy, it is a precondition and 
fundament for having a democratic state. A democratic state is desirable because it prevents 
despotism. Cf. Price, Alistair, “Why the Rule of Law matters”, 19 November 2012, 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/news/why-rule-law-matters. 
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considered necessary it will be mentioned. The practical framework is in 
principle limited to the EU and the CoE, though it should be mentioned that 
the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is an 
important regional actor in Europe regarding rule of law adherence as well. 
Since this essay concerns the law of international organisations, national 
legislation is not particularly accounted for. While being mentioned in the 
thesis below, it should be recalled that many of the sub-organs of reginal 
organisations have some connection with the rule of law. This thesis does take 
a particular focus and interest for the Venice Commission (VC) and the 
European Commission (EC). 
1.4 Previous research 
There are various works written on the rule of law, with different focuses. As 
the core of this essay is understanding regional organisations’ certain position 
on a concept, official working documents from the EU and the CoE has been 
most helpful. A study that has inspired this essay particularly is Petra Bárd et. 
Al. An EU mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights6. This thesis offers a recent account and comparative analysis between 
two relatively new soft law tools, combined with a theoretical framework. 
1.5 Disposition 
The second chapter of this thesis is a theoretical framework that introduces 
the notion of rule of law, and puts it in a historical context. This was found 
relevant since its clear that Europe’s regional organisations does not define 
the rule of law in a vacuum, but have been influenced by the long academic 
debate around this concept. Chapter three and four deals with how two of 
Europe’s most important regional organisations understand and implement 
their strategies on the rule of law. It offers a combination of legal sources, 
commentaries and theoretical sources. The binding legal sources such as the 
treaties as fundamental, since they establish the organisation’s mandate of 
dealing with the issue of the rule of law in its member states. As will be 
demonstrated, binding legal sources such as conventions and statues are 
usually vague and abstains from giving any real meaning to the concept of 
the rule of law. To be able to discern what is meant in a more clear way, ‘soft 
law’ sources have been used, such as communications and notes from the sub-
organs of respective organisation. Chapter five demonstrates how a specific 
case is being dealt with, using tools for combating rule of law threats in 
member states. It is clear that the rule of law is nowadays something 
prioritized, which stems from the fact that it is perceived as increasingly 
threatened. This is probably why Europe’s regional organisations are creating 
new tools and reference documents to expand their working processes. In this 
chapter, the reader is free to decide whether the new tools are effective or not. 
                                                
6 Bárd, Petra et al., “An EU mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 91 / April 2016, p. 3. 
Henceforth ‘Bárd (2016)’. 
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The sixth chapter contains a closing analysis with the authors 
recommendations for building a step forward. With best practices identified, 
the author makes some propositions on how each organisation can learn from 
the other in their work of combating rule of law threats in Europe. 
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2 The rule of law in Europe – a 
western theoretical 
framework 
“wherever law ends, tyranny begins” 
John Locke, Book II, Two treatises of Government 
2.1 Why is the history relevant? 
The Rule of Law has many supporters.7 Few are explicitly against it, which 
could suggest that it is something good and something that society should 
adhere to.8 The consensus however, becomes less apparent when discussing 
the material scope of the rule of law. This part aims to introduce and 
theoretically approach the concept of the rule of law. It will be assessed how 
scholars throughout time have defined and discussed this concept. The 
intention is not to present a full account of the history of the rule of law, but 
rather to convey what might facilitate the understanding of the following 
chapters. To fully grasp how and why the EU and the CoE (with its Venice 
Commission) find the rule of law a fundamental value in their working 
processes, one should understand the historical background of this doctrine. 
Fundamental questions to be addressed are what the rule of law is, how it is 
related to human rights and democracy and why it is important in a democratic 
society and in Europe. 
Initially, it can be stated that there is no absolute definition of the rule 
of law - it remains a subject for debate amongst scholars. What is clear on the 
other hand, is that it differs from a rule of law. When one speaks of the rule 
of law one is referring to an ideal in liberal political morality.9 Other arguably 
                                                
7 Throughout this thesis, ’rule of law’ is used to describe a concept that exists in many other 
languages as well. In International Organisations today, the English version is most 
frequently used. Closest to ‘rule of law’ comes the French État de droit and the German 
Rechtstaat. This thesis will not argue whether understandings of these words differ nor how 
other translations close to ‘rule of law’ differ, but focus on the English term ‘rule of law’. A 
starting point for the Anglo-Saxon tradition could be Chief Justice Marshall locution in 
Marbury v. Madison (1803) 1 Cranch 137, p. 163: “The government of the United States 
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.”. 
8 Although, there are enemies to the rule of law. A prominent legal philosopher that was an 
adversary to liberal values and in favour for a totalitarian view of the state, was Carl 
Schmitt (1888-1985). Cf. Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis by A. Jacobson, B. Schlink, 
The University of Toronto Law Journal, Vol. 53, No. 4 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 443-454, 
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Henceforth ‘Jacobson (2003)’. 
9 Stanford: Waldron, Jeremy, "The Rule of Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/rule-of-law/. Henceforth ‘Waldron 
(2016)’. 
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interconnected values are democracy and human rights.10 Certain elements 
remain uncontroversial and are broadly accepted to be a part of the rule of 
law. In a very general way one could express that the rule of law is about 
protection against abuse of power.11 For the rule of law to have any meaning 
of its own, it must be distinguished from a rule by law, that simply reiterates 
the principle of legality12. The legality principle should be seen as a 
fundamental part, indispensable to the rule of law. The rule of law does 
however encompass more than just merely having sovereign power exercised 
through laws. 
The commonly accepted broad description of this concept seems to 
suggest that a set of rules should be what constrains both a government and 
its citizens.13 The government should abide to these established rules in its 
practising of power and be, according to law, held accountable in the way that 
the law prescribes when there has been a breach of the given rules of 
governance. Without a reasonable amount of compliance with legal norms 
from the citizens, one cannot speak of the rule of law. Therefore, it is implied 
that citizens must comply with the given norms that define their rights and 
duties. Arguably, in the commonly accepted definition lies that the law should 
be equal for everyone and that everyone has access to the law and the 
judiciary.14  
One might say that the rule of law refines the idea that law is a specific 
way to deal with human freedom. Human autonomy seems to be the starting 
point, and there appears to be an intrinsic connection between human freedom 
and law – law organises human freedom. Regulation of freedom then 
becomes a limitation of freedom. This resonates in the work of many 
philosophers. Cicero, that is representing the Roman conception of law and 
state, famously expressed Omnes legum servi sumus ut liberi esse 
possumus (‘we are all servants of the laws in order that we may be free’ or 
                                                
10 The reason for ‘arguably’ is that there are different understandings of what the rule of 
law should encompass, as is best embodied in the formal contra the substantial 
understanding, which will be presented further down in this thesis. 
11 The reason for this statement, which comes from the author, will become more apparent 
in this chapter. In other words, this general sentence is a sort of summary of the views that 
will be presented below. In the wording of ‘rule of law’ it is implied that ‘law’ should be 
what guides governance, in opposition to individual power and will. Individual power is 
often more sensitive to fluctuation and non-concistency, that is why society has created law 
and the principle of legality. The rule of law however, does today, as we shall see, entail 
more than just the principle of legality - it would otherwise be redundant. Cf. Stanford: 
Waldron, Jeremy, "The Rule of Law", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (Henceforth ‘Waldron (2016)’, “ […] legal institutions and 
their procedures should be available to ordinary people to uphold their rights, settle their 
disputes, and protect them against abuses of public and private power.”; Bingham, Tom., 
2010, chapter 3, The Rule of Law, London: Allen Lane (Henceforth ‘Bingham (2010)’. 
“[…] the core of the existing principle of the rule of law: that all persons and authorities 
within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of 
laws publicly made, taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the 
courts.” 
12 Tamanaha, Brian, On the Rule of Law. History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004, p. 92. Henceforth ‘Tamanaha (2004)’. 
13 Waldron (2016). 
14 Ibid. 
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‘we are all slaves of the laws so we can be free’).15 From this quote, Cicero 
can be said to have expressed that there is no real conflict between freedom 
and the law and hence give support to the idea that law merely organises 
human freedom. This view, as we shall see, is amongst others also held by 
Immanuel Kant. 
Ordinary people, i.e. not politicians or legal philosophers, usually 
equate the rule of law with the absence of corruption, the independence of the 
judiciary, and a presumption in favour of liberty.16 Today, views and attitudes 
of citizens does bear an importance for measuring the level of rule of law, 
most notably in the index of the World Justice Project.17 The knowledge that 
a state is perceived to comply well with the rule of law may for example be 
positive for business, as it provides a form of certainty. Tom Bingham states 
that “[n]o one would choose to do business […] involving large sums of 
money, in a country where parties’ rights and obligations were undecided.”18 
The rule of law is an organic concept, in constant change due to its 
partly political nature. The remaining chapter serves as a historical 
background and hence the ‘common ground’ and theoretical framework from 
which the EU and the CoE derives their views.19  
2.1.1 What can Aristotle and his concept of law 
teach us? 
The modern scholarly discussions on the rule of law are still highly inspired 
by the original formulators of the concept. Ideas that are linked to the modern 
interpretations of the rule of law can be traced back all the way to Aristotle. 
In Politics20, Aristotle raised the question and dichotomy of whether rule of 
man or rule of law was the better. He understood that not only was the quality 
of law crucial in a society, but also what type of regime was operating through 
the law, and their subsequent attitude towards the law. This is an important 
observation that resonates until today and is highly relevant in Europe. In 
corruption matters, it is fairly uncontroversial to conclude that government 
officials need to adhere to corruption laws to a greater extent than currently 
exhibited. What perhaps has been underestimated, is that attitudes towards 
corruption need to shift in society as a whole, which most importantly 
includes the citizens as well. Without citizens resenting corruption in all its 
forms, rule of law is not as strong as it could be.21 Generally, Aristotle can be 
said to have had positive approach to having law as the primary way of 
                                                
15 Marcus Tullius Cicero,Pro Cluentio 53.146. 
16 Ibid.. 
17 https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index/wjp-rule-law-index-2016. 
18 Cf. Bingham (2010). This quote finds support in this work as well: Barro, R., 2000, 
“Democracy and the Rule of Law”, in Governing for Prosperity, B. de Mesquita and H. 
Root (eds.), New Haven: Yale University Press. 
19 It must be underlined that the intention is not to give a full account of the history of the 
rule of law in an encyclopaedian way, as numerous works on this matter already has been 
successfully written. See, for example Tamanaha (2004). 
20 Aristotle, The Politics (c. 350 BC), Stephen Everson (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988. 
21 The parliamentary assembly of the CoE has stressed this point in Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1943 (2013) Final version. 
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governance. He saw the politician as a tool for creating and maintaining a 
constitution as well as introducing reforms when these were deemed 
necessary. Aristotle regarded the legislative science as more important than 
everyday political activity such as ruling by decrees.22 His legacy has 
significantly influenced our modern conception of the rule of law, which can 
be identified in the works of later legal philosophers as well as the approach 
taken by Europe’s regional actors today.23 
2.1.2 The Rechtstaat 
Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) doctrine of Rechtstaat24 is another fundament 
for the contemporary conception of the rule of law. For Kant, the legitimate 
basis of state power is human freedom.25 In the sense of his political 
philosophy, freedom is about the individual’s freedom of action and “the 
independence from being constrained by another’s choice”. This freedom of 
choice should be respected even if the choice is not rational or virtuous. The 
existence of the state is not an obstacle for freedom, but rather provides the 
means to uphold freedom when someone is hindering another’s freedom.26 In 
other words, the power of the state should be focused on protecting the 
citizens from arbitrary authority and this is best done through having a 
supreme written constitution.  
                                                
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI, chapter 8 from Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 
19, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, 
William Heinemann Ltd. 1934. 
23 These views on decrees are held by Europe’s regional organisations today as well. In the 
aftermath of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016, the Turkish government issued 
a state of emergency whereby President Erdogan’s power to rule by decree laws was 
drastically elevated. This led to, inter alia, tens of thousands of people being suspended 
from their jobs in public sector and numerous NGOs being shut down. President Erdogan’s 
motivation was that they posed a threat to the Turkish state by having affiliations with the 
Gülen-movement, whose leader was pointed out as the conspirator of the attack. With a 
reference to the values embedded in the Rule of Law and human rights, the Venice 
Commission has in several opinions criticised Turkey for the measures provided in the 
emergency decree laws to be too extensive.  
This event has been extensively reported in the global media. For example: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/29/europe/turkey-post-coup-arrest-numbers/ [Accessed 23 
May 12:00]. Turkey’s amendments to the constitution adopted by the grand national 
assembly on 21 January 2017 and to be submitted to a national referendum on 16 april 2017 
was criticised by the Venice commission as a threat to the Rule of Law. Most recent Venice 
Commission Opinion on this matter:  Opinion No. 872 / 2016, document CDL-
AD(2017)007. 
24 In German, ‘rule of law’ is translated as ‘Rechtstaat’. When using ‘Rechtstaat’ in this 
section, it is referred to the historical use by the cited authors, and not the modern 
interpretation of the German word ‘Rechtstaat’, with respect for how the latter has 
influenced the current. For a comparison on modern differences between ‘Rechtstaat’, 
‘Rule of law’ and État de droit’, see Pech Laurent, The Rule of Law as a Constitutional 
Principle of the European Union, Jean Monnet Working Paper 04/09. Henceforth ‘Pech 
(2009)’. For further studies on legal thought during the Weimar period, by most importantly 
Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen, see: Jacobson (2003).  
25 Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, (8:290-91), 2012,Gregor, 
M, Timmermann, J, trans., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
26 Rauscher, Frederick, "Kant's Social and Political Philosophy", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/kant-social-political/>. 
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The Rechtstaat operates with a hierarchical set of norms. The 
consequences of this is that the executive power must be founded on statutory 
law and that parliamentary law is hierarchically inferior to the constitution. 
This implies that the Rechtstaat includes judicial review by a constitutional 
court. The doctrine of Rechtstaat is closely connected Hans Kelsen’s (1881-
1973) idea of the hierarchical organised legal system.27 Kant’s doctrine of 
Rechtstaat was developed and popularized by Robert Von Mohl (1799-1875) 
in the early 19th century.28 
Today, many values found in the doctrine of Rechtstaat are well 
embedded in Europe’s regional organisations conception of the rule of law.29 
It is unthinkable for a state that is said to comply with the rule of law to not 
have a constitution that sets the framework for the exercise of power. 
 
2.1.3 The Rule of Law and Separation of 
Powers 
John Locke (1632-1704) is one of the most prominent political philosophers 
to develop the idea of separation of powers, a theory crucially related to, if 
not fundamental to, the modern view of the rule of law. His idea was later 
built upon by Montesquieu30 (1689-1755). In Locke’s view, a government is 
legitimate when the power is divided between the legislative, executive and 
federative power.31 The legislative power, which is bound and legitimized by 
natural law32, is administrating “[…] how the force of the commonwealth 
shall be employed […]”.33 The executive power has the authority to enforce 
the laws and the federative power acts as an entity towards other countries. 
Although Locke was not opposed to the idea of some chosen people, such as 
“Kings or Rulers”, to have a prerogative right, i.e.  “the power of doing good 
without a rule”34 he likewise considered the legislative power, and hence the 
law, to be supreme.35  
Montesquieu’s conception of the separation of powers is slightly 
different. To prevent despotism, the separation of government should be 
                                                
27 Kelsen, Hans, 1960/1967. Pure Theory of Law, M. Knight, trans., Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
28 Mainly through his book Die deutsche Polizeiwissenschaft nach den Grundsätzen des 
Rechtsstaates, (Published 1844 by H.Laupp). 
29 This is a general statement that is supposed to summarize the modern opinion by 
Europe’s regional actors. It will become clear in chapter three and four that the EU and the 
CoE considers a written constitution to be essential for the rule of law. That a constitutional 
court has to be able to conduct effective constitutional review will become apparent in 
chapter five on the Polish Constitutional crisis.  
30 Full name: Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu. 
31 Tuckness, Alex, "Locke's Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy(Spring 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/locke-political/>. 
32 Locke, John, §135, Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, 
2016, Goldie, M, edt, Oxford University Press. Henceforth ‘Locke (2016)’. 
33 Locke (2016), §143. 
34 Locke (2016), §166. 
35 Locke (2016), §149. 
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divided between the legislative, the executive and the judiciary.36 It is 
fundamental that these three sources of power should be administrated by 
different persons so they can control each other and hence sustain a balance, 
that also satisfies the citizens.37 
These preceding examples of how past ideas of the rule of law are still 
relevant for modern interpretation.38 This part will now shift focus to some 
thinkers of the 20th and 21th century, such as Lon Fuller (1902-1978), Joseph 
Raz (1939-), Tom Bingham (1933-2010) and Jeremy Waldron (1953-).  
2.1.4 The ‘laundry lists’  
Some scholars of the 20th century have in their, although different views of 
the rule of law, started to work with lists of principles. These principles 
would, if they are fulfilled, indicate that a particular state is acting in 
congruence with the rule of law - a “manual” for good governance. However, 
it is worth mentioning that they might not have anything more in common 
substantially except for the fact that they work with lists of principles. These 
lists are often talked about as ‘laundry’ or ‘wash’ lists.  
One approach to the rule of law, held today most notably by Joseph 
Raz39, is the formal approach, means that the rule of law should not be 
confused with other virtues such as democracy, justice, equity, equality 
before the law, human rights, respect for human dignity and so on. The rule 
of law is in this view a purely formal theory or concept that does not 
encompass the above-mentioned values. His principles of the rule of law are: 
(1) All laws should be prospective, open, and clear, (2) Laws should be 
relatively stable, (3) The making of particular laws (particular legal orders) 
should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules, (4) The 
independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed, (5) the principles of natural 
justice must be observed, (6) the courts should have review powers over the 
implementation of the other principles, (7) the courts should be easily 
accessible  and (8) the discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not 
be allowed to pervert the law.40 
                                                
36 Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Book XI, Ch. VI, The spirit of the laws, 1989, 
Cohler, A.M, etd., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
37 Bok, Hilary, "Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat", The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 
38 Separation of powers remains of high relevance today, and signs of confusion are often 
condemned by Europe’s regional actors as a threat to the rule of law. Poland’s new law 
amending the law of the Constitutional Tribunal in 2015 has been criticized for threatening 
the rule of law and the balance in the separation of powers. The law introduced several 
changes to the Tribunal’s functioning such as lowering the number of judges that need to be 
present for decisions on crucial issues, raising the importance of the President’s veto on the 
laws, changing decision making from majority to two thirds and cases need now to be dealt 
with in order as they arrive and not in order of importance as before. Although the new law 
was amended, the Venice Commission has continued to criticise it in an Opinion of 14 
October 2016. More on this further below. Another legal theorist with largely influential 
views on the rule of law was Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922). 
39 Although Raz was inspired by earlier thinkers such as F.A. Hayek (1899-1992). 
40 Raz, Joseph., 1977, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue”, from his book, The Authority of 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979. Henceforth ‘Raz (1977)’. 
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Lon Fuller constructed a list of eight principles, that qualifies law 
through morality, called “the inner morality of law”. The usage of ‘morality’ 
can be questioned and has been criticised41, since the principles seem formal: 
(1) generality, (2) publicity, (3) prospectivity, (4) intelligibility, (5) 
consistency, (6) practicability, (7) stability, and (8) congruence.42 
The approaches by both Joseph Raz and Lon Fuller are formal, because 
they concern only how norms are governed and not their substance. Joseph 
Raz has expressed that “the rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal 
system may possess and by which it is to be judged”.43 
There are also substantive approaches to the rule of law. One of the 
critics of Raz is Tom Bingham, who advocates a “thick” understanding of the 
rule of law. He is in favour of incorporating human and fundamental rights 
within the rule of law concept, and argues that a state which represses certain 
minorities cannot be said to take the rule of law into account, even if the 
state’s action is preceded by an excellent formal procedure.44  
Above is the dichotomy of the ‘thin’ versus the ‘thick’ understanding 
of the rule of law. It can be debated whether the formal approach even is a 
purely formal one, because it protects some values that arguably are not 
entirely formal. To state that the rule of law should be formal and not 
substantive is not purely a formal argument, but rather a political or a moral 
argument. If law is required to be general, it is suggested that law must be 
general because we consider each other as equal and that rules must be applied 
equally to equal cases. Underlying this formal approach is therefore equality, 
which is not God given and hence moral or political. To conclude, even the 
formal version of the rule of law takes some account of human dignity, and 
therefore does not exclude the substantial approach. Put it in other words, the 
approaches bear more similarities than may appear at first glance. It might be 
easier to gain a larger consensus amongst states on the meaning of the rule of 
law with a formal approach. Jeremy Waldron has pointed out that a problem 
with the substantive approach is that anyone who wants can incorporate their 
ideals into the rule of law, which can lead to a dilution of any real meaning, 
“as people struggle to use the same term to express disparate ideals”.45 
2.1.5 The Political approach  
Jeremy Waldron characterizes the rule of law as part of a political discussion, 
in which disagreement is the most important aspect – without disagreement, 
there is no politics and the rule of law is a part of politics.46 His theory might 
seem somewhat strange, as most legal theories try to separate law and politics. 
Most people prefer a legal judge rather than a political judge. Even though 
law finds it origin in politics, as soon as it becomes a rule, we would like to 
                                                
41 Nicholson, Peter P., 1974, The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics, Ethics 
Vol. 84, No. 4, pp. 307-326, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
42 Fuller, Lon., 1964, The Morality of Law, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
43 Raz (1977), p. 211.  
44 Bingham (2010). 
45 Waldron (2016). 
46 Waldron, Jeremy, "The Concept and the Rule of Law" (2008). Sibley Lecture Series. 
Paper 29.  
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keep it far from the realm of politics. In defence of this, Waldron suggests 
that law is a specific type of governance. According to Waldon, the Rule of 
Law is an ‘essentially contested concept’.47 The term was first introduced by 
Walter Bryce Gallie (1912-1998) and aims to facilitate the understanding of 
concepts that lack a definite interpretation. While there can be a general 
agreement on a broad definition, the concept will always lack an agreement 
on the best realisation.48 
The advantage of Waldron’s political approach to the rule of law, is that 
it becomes something that is not fixed and that can be discussed and 
elaborated upon. But if the definition of the rule of law falls within the realm 
of politics, it may be hard to conceive it as something normative and as a 
yardstick. The rule of law must then depend upon political goodwill and 
wisdom.  
2.1.6 The Moral approach  
Another approach to the rule of law is a moral approach. According to John 
Rawls, the Rule of Law is undeniably connected to the moral idea of human 
freedom, because law interferes with freedom, and human freedom has a 
legitimate priority.49 In this aspect, Rawls was inspired by Kant. The priority 
of human freedom implies that limitation of freedom can only be possible 
when taking into account the concept of freedom itself. Because we are all 
free we must also be equal and this must be reflected in the laws. Rawls 
principles for the rule of law are (1) rules must be made possible to abide by, 
(2) equal cases must be treated equally and laws should be stable over time, 
and (3) nullum crime sine lege, law must be clear, published and general.50 
Rawls’ principles for the rule of law is not a laundry list but rather a set of 
principles based on a moral argument of justice. 
 
2.2 Contemporary organisations and the 
Rule of Law 
From this section it will become clear that the substantive approach, i.e. the 
approach of incorporating values such as human rights, justice and democracy 
into the rule of law, seems to prevail in the understanding of some 
contemporary NGOs that have the rule of law as their core value.  
The World Justice Project (henceforth WJP), an American NGO, has 
the main target of advocating the rule of law around the world.51 One of their 
most prominent activities is ‘the Rule of Law index’, where 113 countries are 
                                                
47 Waldron, Jeremy, 2002, “Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in 
Florida)?” Law and Philosophy, 21: 137–64. 
48 Gallie, W. B., Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
New Series, Vol. 56 (1955 - 1956), pp. 167-198, New Jersey: Blackwell Publishing on 
behalf of The Aristotelian Society. 
49 Rawls, John. 1999, A Theory of Justice, chapter ‘the Rule of Law’, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press.	
50 Ibid. 
51 http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-we-do-0. 
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being assessed on their rule of law compliance according to the parameters 
set out by the organisation.52 In the WJP’s definition of the rule of law, one 
can find traces of many legal philosopher’s ideas of the rule of law. The four 
principles for their definition are mainly formal. However, there are also 
traces of a substantive approach. Most notably, the parameters for the rule of 
law index include values such as “fundamental rights”, “absence of 
corruption” and “open government”. How citizens and experts are assessing 
their own communities does also bear importance on the rule of law 
evaluation.53 
The international Network to Promote the Rule of Law (henceforth 
INPROL) is a global, online community of some +3000 rule of law 
practitioners from 120 countries and 300 organizations.54 INPROL is a 
community where practitioners from different backgrounds have the 
possibility to discuss the importance of the rule of law. The members’ 
common denominator is that they work on rule of law reform issues in post-
conflict and developing countries, from a policy-, practice- or research-
perspective.55 No single definition is to be found on INPROL’s website, but 
based on the topics of publications and news that they choose to publish, one 
can draw the conclusion that the overall view of the network is a substantive 
one, not hesitating to incorporate human rights and justice within the scope 
of rule of law protection. 
The United Nations (UN) is another strong advocate for the rule of law, 
and has a reference to it in the preamble of the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights from 194856: 
 
“Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule 
of law, […]” 
 
At the UN, the work for the rule of law is embodied in many different forms, 
most notably in the High Commissioner for Human Rights57 with the 
OHCHR58, the UN Global Compact59 and work for peacekeeping and rule of 
law60. The preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not 
define the rule of law. However, studying the UN approach as a whole, one 
inevitably comes to the conclusion that the organisation, in line with other 
regional organisations, defines the rule of law in a substantive way. The rule 
of law and human rights are in the UN approach interconnected.61 
                                                
52 http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index. 
53 Ibid. 
54 http://www.inprol.org/about-inprol. 
55 Ibid. 
56 http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
57 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/WhoWeAre.aspx. 
58 http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/RuleOfLaw/Pages/RuleOfLawIndex.aspx. 
59 https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/our-work/governance/rule-law. 
60 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/issues/ruleoflaw.shtml. 
61 See Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 16 September 2005, A/RES/60/1, p. 
27 “We recommit ourselves to actively protecting and promoting all human rights, the rule 
of law and democracy and recognize that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and 
that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the United 
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2.3 Conclusion – why is the definition 
relevant? 
As has been demonstrated, the rule of law is a concept that has existed in 
some way or another during more than two thousand years. The rule of law is 
a living idea and not just a theoretical concept. It is fundamental to certain 
regional organisations in Europe, such as the EU, the CoE, OSCE, the UN 
and numerous other NGOs. These organisations work with the rule of law in 
their daily work, and recent developments in Europe has intensified the need 
to further uphold the principles enshrined in the rule of law. The definition is 
relevant because it guides the practical work on the rule of law in the member 
states. For example, when one of the CoE action plans for a specific country 
is being implemented “on the ground”, it is helpful if the definition of the rule 
of law is clear, so that the staff can know what they work with when they for 
example are training local government in the strengthening the rule of law. 
It remains to be seen how the rule of law is defined in these 
organisations. The following two chapters offer an account for how the EU 
and the CoE defines and works with the rule of law. It will be explored how 
the concept is defined in official language, and whether there is such a clear 
definition.  
                                                
Nations, and call upon all parts of the United Nations to promote human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in accordance with their mandates.” 
See also General Assembly Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 September 
2012, A/RES/67/1, point 7, “We are convinced that the rule of law and development are 
strongly interrelated and mutually reinforcing, that the advancement of the rule of law at the 
national and international levels is essential for sustained and inclusive economic growth, 
sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and hunger and the full realization of 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the right to development, all of 
which in turn reinforce the rule of law, and for this reason we are convinced that this 
interrelationship should be considered in the post-2015 international development agenda.”. 
Cf. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, 18 September 2000, A/RES/55/2. 
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3 The European Union and the 
rule of law 
3.1 Introduction  
The next two chapters put the conceptual definition of the rule of law aside 
and instead examines how the rule of law gains life within the two major 
regional organisations in Europe – the European Union (EU) and the Council 
of Europe (CoE).  Both chapters will follow a similar structure. Initially, the 
legal mandate and basis for working with the rule of law will be presented 
and then it will be explored how the different institutions within the respective 
organisations work with the rule of law.  
The EU and the CoE are two of the major regional organisations in 
Europe. It comes naturally when writing about international organisations and 
the rule of law to include the CoE, since one of its core values is the rule of 
law. The EU has also expressed that the rule of law is one of its ‘key common 
values’.62 As both the EU and the CoE have neighbourhood policies, 
transmitting their views on external states, their policies become very 
influential in the whole world. In other words, the views held be European 
regional organisations have more influence than only in Europe. This makes 
it even more important and interesting to investigate what exactly is meant 
when using certain terms, in this case the rule of law. By examining one recent 
tool from each organisation, it becomes more clear how combating threats to 
rule of law is being implemented. 
3.2 Basis in Treaties 
The preamble of the latest treaty of the European Union (TEU)63, the Lisbon 
Treaty, mentions the rule of law twice. The first time, it establishes that 
inspiration is drawn from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of 
Europe, from which has been developed some “universal values of the 
inviolable and inalienable rights of […] the rule of law”. The second time the 
rule of law is mentioned, the treaty confirms the Member States’ attachment 
to the same principle.  
In article 2 TEU, it is stated that the Union is founded on, amongst other 
values, the rule of law. This value also guides the Union’s external action – 
in article 21 TEU, the EU confirms that its’ actions on the international scene 
shall be guided by its own principles, which it seeks to advance in the wider 
world. Once again, amongst other values such as democracy and human 
rights, the rule of law is reiterated. A precondition for joining the EU, which 
                                                
62 A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, p. 6, Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, COM(2014) 158 final/2. 
Henceforth ‘Framework (2014)’. See Article 2 TEU. 
63 Treaty on European union (Consolidated version 2016) - official Journal of the European 
Union, C 202, 7 June 2016. 
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is found in Article 49 TEU, is to respect the values referred to in Article 2 
TEU, which includes the rule of law.  
The rule of law is mentioned in the preamble of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights64, as a principle on which the EU is founded upon. It 
should be noted that the rule of law is in the TEU referred to as a “value” in 
comparison with the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which refers to it as a 
“principle”. Another relevant provision is found in the Treaty of the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)65, Article 67(1). The rule of law 
is not explicitly mentioned, but by reading the wording it could be argued that 
it is mentioned indirectly; “The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, 
security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal 
systems and traditions of the Member States.” The EU as a legal entity has 
not yet acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)66 and 
is therefore not formally bound by it, although the jurisprudence from the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) does bear implications for EU 
law, since all EU member states have ratified the ECHR. If or when the EU 
accedes to the ECHR it will become possible for individuals and undertakings 
to apply to the ECtHR for legal review of the acts of EU institutions.67 
As far as the TEU is concerned, this is all that is mentioned about the 
rule of law. This clearly does not provide much information for understanding 
how the EU as a legal entity perceives the rule of law. One could ask oneself 
if the EU understanding of the rule of law is defined in conformity with the 
national understandings of the principle, or if the EU aims to develop its own 
definition. Article 2 TEU does not explicitly require the EU to rely on national 
constitutional traditions to interpret the rule of law, contrary to what it does 
as regards to the principle of respect for fundamental rights in Article 6.3 
TEU.68  
The major constitutional traditions of Europe - the French, German and 
English have their own language for describing the rule of law, which have 
emerged from different philosophical traditions. While there might be 
differences in the understanding of this concept to this day, they cannot be 
said to be so irreconcilable that the regional organisations are unable to work 
with this term, as representing the gathered European constitutional 
traditions. It is worth quoting the European commission in this respect; 
 
“Mutual trust among EU Member States and their respective legal systems is the foundation 
of the Union. The way the rule of law is implemented at national level plays a key role in this 
respect.”69 
 
                                                
64 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2016) - Official Journal of the 
European Union, C 202, 7 June 2016. 
65 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2016) - Official 
Journal of the European Union, C 202, 7 June 2016. 
66 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European 
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR). 
67 More information on this subject on this link: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/accessionEU&c= [Accessed 23 
May 12:00]. 
68 Pech (2009). 
69 ‘Framework (2014)’, p. 2. 
 21 
It is still debatable whether there is a discrepancy between national 
understandings of the rule of law and the “EU understanding”. This is 
however not the question this thesis seeks to answer. A substantial connection 
is nonetheless hard to deny. The different types of legal situations that require 
mutual recognition amongst member-states does perhaps best exemplify this. 
A starting point was a judgement of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
establishing the Cassis De Dijon-principle, which determines that products 
sold legally in one member state cannot be illegal in another member state.70  
As is pointed out in the new EU Framework to strengthen the rule of 
law, more recent cases establish that judgements in civil and commercial 
matters of a national court must be automatically recognised and enforced in 
another Member State and a European Arrest Warrant against an alleged 
criminal issued in one Member State must be executed as such in another 
Member State.71 While these examples do not show that EU member states 
perceive the rule of law identically, they at least have agreed to trust each 
other in judicial matters72, which subsequently could point to the fact that 
there are similar views on how important parts of the judiciary are to be 
organised. 
3.3 A new EU Framework to strengthen 
the Rule of Law - why was it needed? 
As we have seen, amongst other values, rule of law adherence is a 
precondition for acceding to the EU, which was elaborated upon in 1993 
when the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ was formulated: 
 
“Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims 
of political, economic and monetary union”73 
 
However, there was no specific mechanism or follow-up process to monitor 
whether continuous adherence to the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ was fulfilled after 
accession. This ‘one-way-street’ might be a problem and could possibly be 
abused, which may subsequently lower credibility for the EU as a Union 
                                                
70 Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979.  
Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein.  
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hessisches Finanzgericht - Germany.  
Measures heaving an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions.  
Case 120/78. 
It should be noted that there are exceptions to this principle, mainly found in Article 36 
TFEU. 
71 Framework (2014). See also Judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), 30 May 2013 
Jeremy F. v Premier ministre, Case C-168/13 PPU, paras 35 and 36.  
72 For example, via European Arrest warrant laws that are implemented in national 
legislation. See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/recognition-decision/european-arrest-
warrant/index_en.htm.  
73 Hillion, ‘The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny’ in: C. Hillion, EU Enlargement: A 
Legal Approach, Oxford: Hart, 2004, 1–23. See also footnote 1 in Bárd (2016). 
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founded upon certain values, that it additionally seeks to advance in the wider 
world.74 It has been argued that systematic deconstruction of the rule of law 
results in fundamental rights violations “in all possible ways”, which is to be 
understood as posing threats to democracy and human rights as well.75 
 
3.3.1 Pre-framework options for responding to 
rule of law threats 
The ultimate consequences for a member state, if Article 7 TEU is invoked 
are suspension of rights deriving from the Treaties and voting rights being 
withdrawn from the Council. In other words, fundamental parts of EU 
membership can be suspended, which is such a serious procedure that it is 
commonly referred to as a ‘nuclear option’ or a ‘last resort’.76 Article 7 TEU 
has never been activated. The role of the ECJ if Article 7 would be invoked 
is only to decide upon the legality of such an act, according to Article 269 in 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
In practice, it is hard to conceive how such a procedure could take place, 
since no framework is presented for assessing if the nature of a supposed rule 
of law threat meets the intention of Article 7 TEU. An Article 7 procedure 
should then perhaps be seen as a mainly diplomatic or political tool. Due to 
the consequences it could bear, it is not hard to understand why it has never 
been invoked.77 In a Union whose existence is increasingly being questioned 
in Member States, Article 7 TEU is probably not seen as a sensible option. 
The external message of cooperation is arguably in this aspect a stronger 
value to uphold.  
A tool that has been proven to be somewhat, but not sufficiently 
effective towards perceived rule of law threats is the infringement procedure 
pursuant to Article 258 TFEU.78 The commission has by this Article the 
mandate of bringing a matter to the ECJ if a Member State is considered to 
                                                
74 Expression ‘one-way-street’ taken from: Bàrd (2016). See also the statement by Vice-
President of the European Commission V. Reding, 12 September 2012, European 
Parliament (2012), Plenary debate on the political situation in Romania, “Once this 
Member State has joined the European Union, we appear not to have any instrument to see 
whether the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary still command respect”. 
75 Bàrd (2016), p. 3. 
76 Framework (2014), p. 6. 
77 "If a Member State breaches the fundamental values in a manner sufficiently serious to 
be caught by Article 7, this is likely to undermine the very foundation of the EU and the 
trust between its members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs", Communication 
from the Commission of 15 October 2003: Respect for and promotion of the values on 
which the Union is based, COM(2003) 606 final, henceforth ‘Communication (2003)’. 
Voices have been heard in the EP that Article 7 TEU should be triggered in respect to 
Hungary. To this day, 22 May 2017 it has not been the case yet. See 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20170511IPR74350/fundamental-
rights-in-hungary-meps-call-for-triggering-article-7. 
78 The new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law points out three cases to 
exemplify this: C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, (equal treatment as regards the 
compulsory retirement of judges and public prosecutors); C-518/07 Commission v 
Germany [2010] ECR I-01885 and C-614/10 Commission v Austria, (independence of data 
protection authorities). 
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have failed to fulfil an obligation under the treaties. Herein lies also the 
problem; such an important matter for the EU as a threat to the rule of law 
does not always constitute a breach of a specific provision of EU law. Another 
tool related to the matter is Article 260 TFEU, that gives the EC the mandate 
of issuing a sanction in the form of a penalty payment if a Member State fails 
to comply with a judgement of the ECJ.79 It has been stated that Article 7 
TEU does in fact mandate EU intervention “even if the threats or breaches of 
EU values concern issues lying outside of the EU scope of competence”.80 
While this might be a theoretical possibility, the fact that it has never been the 
case should speak for itself. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights does incorporate rights that are 
relevant to the rule of law, such as Article 47 on the right to an effective and 
fair trial. However, according to Article 51, the charter is only valid when 
member states are implementing Union law, which may lead to a failure in 
addressing national threats to the rule of law.81 
Some highlights of informal intergovernmental cooperation on the rule 
of law should be mentioned. Most relevant in this aspect is the “rule of law 
dialogue”, of which the conclusions were on 16 December 2014 jointly 
adapted by the General Affairs Council and the member states in the Council, 
thus establishing the dialogue.82 The purpose of the dialogue is to ensure 
respect for the rule of law by establishing “[…] an annual rule of law dialogue 
and foresee possible thematic debates in the Council (General Affairs) in 
order to promote and safeguard rule of law in the framework of the Treaties 
as one of the key values on which the Union is based.”.83 The dialogue is first 
and foremost intergovernmental, which means that the European Parliament 
(EP) or the European Commission (EC) does not have a formal role, although 
the latter is invited. The first dialogue took place during the Luxembourg 
Presidency in the Council (General Affairs) on 17 November 2015. Themes 
such as the role of the rule of law in responding to antisemitism and anti-
Muslim hatred, and the rule of law in the age of digitalization were 
discussed.84 
On 24 May 2016, the European Council held, under Dutch presidency, 
its second annual rule of law dialogue with a focus on the challenges that the 
current migratory flows create for the safeguarding of the EU's fundamental 
values. Bert Koenders, the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs 
expressed: 
 
                                                
79 See http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/applying-eu-law/infringements-proceedings/financial-
sanctions/index_en.htm [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
80 Bàrd (2016), p. 6. See also Communication (2003), page 5. 
81 This matter is elaborated upon in Commission, Communication, p. 10, "Strategy for the 
effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental rights" of 19 October 2010 
(COM(2010) 573 final). 
82 Conclusions of the Council of the European Union and the member states meeting within 
the Council on ensuring respect for the rule of law, General Affairs Council meeting, 
Brussels, 16 December 2014. 
83 Council of the European Union, Note 8774/16, Brussels, 13 May 2016.  
84Council of the European Union, Note 13744/15, Ensuring the respect for the rule of law – 
Dialogue and exchange of views, 9 November 2015, 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13744-2015-INIT/en/pdf.  
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"The rule of law is one of the fundamental values of the European Union and a cornerstone 
of European cooperation. It is not only an intrinsic value, but is also essential for the smooth 
functioning of the internal market through enhancing mutual trust between and within 
member states. The significant inflows of refugees are without doubt a test to these values. 
But only by respecting these values ourselves and ensuring their respect by those who come 
to us we will be able to overcome the migration challenge and successfully integrate refugees 
in our societies. No member state has a monopoly on virtue or vice, and the rule of law 
requires ongoing effort and self-reflection"85 
 
Soft power in the form of political persuasion and dialogue does take place 
within the EU and the member states. Their success rate is hard to discern. 
By learning from history, it is clear that when a state takes a turn against the 
rule of law, outside criticism does not necessarily make an important 
impact.86 Political dialogues with no concrete improvements are just window 
dressing. The dialogues have so far taken a substantive stance on the 
interpretation of rule of law, incorporating inter alia discrimination against 
minority groups as a threat to the rule of law. 
Since 2012, the EU publishes an annual rapport called ‘The EU Justice 
Scoreboard’, giving a “[…] comparative overview of the quality, 
independence and efficiency of justice systems in the European Union”.87 The 
aim is allegedly to assist Member States in improving effectiveness of their 
justice systems. Since 2017, the scoreboard has developed its purpose, 
including new aspects and parameters of the functioning of justice systems 
such as access to justice for customer related issues and length of criminal 
court proceedings relating to money laundering offences.88 The report is 
issued with the context of justice reform being a high priority for the EU and 
the evaluation is made with three key words – efficiency, quality and 
independence. The source for the data included comes mainly from the CoE 
Commission for the Evaluation of the Efficiency of Justice. The impact of the 
scoreboard is not very profound, since the report does not come with any 
binding force. Therefore, it should be seen as a part of the whole spectrum of 
the EU’s work with highlighting the rule of law as a prioritized issue. Another 
reporting mechanism worth taking note of is the ‘EU Anti-corruption Report’, 
established on 6 June 201189. The work with issuing reports on a continuous 
level seems however to have ceased.90 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
85 Council of the European Union, Note 8774/16, Brussels, 13 May 2016, Presidency non-
paper for the Council (General Affairs) on 24 May 2016 - Rule of law dialogue. 
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-8774-2016-INIT/en/pdf. See also: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2016/05/24/ [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
86 The Mammadov-case in the ECtHR that will be commented upon in the next part is a 
clear example of that. 
87 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm [Accessed 23 May 
12:00]. 
88 Ibid. 
89 https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report_en [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
90 https://euobserver.com/institutional/136775 [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
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3.3.2 The gap filler - what is included in the new 
framework? 
In 2014, the EC issued a Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council, called “A new EU framework to strengthen the Rule of Law”91 as a 
part of the EU Justice Agenda for 2020.92 The previous chapter was intended 
to show why such a new tool was considered important for enforcing the rule 
of law in Europe. 
Throughout the communication, the EC depicts a need for intensified 
work to respond to threats to the rule of law in Europe. These threats are said 
to have triggered a “clear request from the public at large for the EU, and 
notably the Commission, to take action”.93 The current EU mechanisms are 
deemed as not satisfactory in addressing these threats adequately. 
It is made clear in the new Framework that it does not address individual 
breaches of fundamental rights by a miscarriage of justice, as those should be 
dealt with by the national judicial systems and by the protection offered under 
the ECHR. Instead, the purpose of the new framework is to address threats to 
the rule of law which are of a systemic nature.  
The political, institutional and/or legal order of a Member State as such, 
its constitutional structure, separation of powers, the independence or 
impartiality of the judiciary, or its system of judicial review including 
constitutional justice where it exists, must be threatened – for example as a 
result of the adoption of new measures or of widespread practices of public 
authorities and the lack of domestic redress. The Framework will be activated 
when national "rule of law safeguards" do not seem capable of effectively 
addressing those threats.94 
The new EU Framework is intended to work as a “three stage process” 
– assessment, recommendation and follow-up. Judging by the Framework, it 
remains somewhat unclear as to what should initiate the assessment. It is 
stated that “The Commission will collect and examine all the relevant 
information and assess whether there are clear indications of a systemic threat 
to the rule of law […]”.  
The assessment is aimed at reaching an opinion to whether there is or 
is not a systemic threat to the rule of law. If there is indeed such a situation, a 
dialogue will be commenced with the member state in question. A part of the 
assessment is the dialogue as such. Non-cooperative actions that are in 
conflict with the duty of sincere cooperation set out in Article 4(3) TEU is 
being considered when measuring the seriousness of the threat. 
 
If such a threat to the rule of law is considered serious and systematic, the EC 
will issue a “rule of law recommendation” containing the issues of concern 
and when relevant a concrete proposal on how to resolve them. The member 
state has then to take steps within a fixed time limit to address and solve the 
problems. 
                                                
91 Framework (2014). 
92 For the agenda in its entirety, see http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/future_justice_brochure_en.pdf [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
93 Framework (2014), p. 1. 
94 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Lastly, the third step consists in evaluating the follow-up given by the 
member state in question relating to the previous recommendation. Not much 
is said in the new EU Framework about this step except that it is intended to 
be an exchange of views concerning the situation. If this process does not bear 
fruit, the EC states that it will “assess the possibility of activating one of the 
mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU”.95 
The bodies of the CoE (most notably the Venice Commission) and the 
EU Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) are exemplified as trusted sources for 
knowledge.96 The FRA has a broad mandate to evaluate member state 
cooperation with EU values, most notably in Article 4(1)(a) of the Council 
regulation establishing the FRA.97 A broad array of contributors for 
monitoring is set out Article 4 of the Council regulation, including NGOs and 
other international organisations. Amongst the articles of the regulation 
setting out the purpose and procedures that have been mandated, a definition 
of the rule of law is not to be found. Other possible partners are the networks 
of the Presidents of Supreme Courts of the EU98, the Association of the 
Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the EU99, or 
the Judicial Councils100. It is not specified in what way the assistance of these 
judicial organisations will be used. 
                                                
95 Ibid., p. 8. 
96 Ibid., p. 7. 
97 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights. 
98 Network of the Presidents of the Supreme Judicial Courts of the European Union (see 
http://www.networkpresidents.eu/). 
99 Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union(see http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/) [Accessed 23 May 12:00].  
100 European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (see http://www.encj.eu). [Accessed 23 
May 12:00]. 
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Picture: Illustration of the process for the new Framework. Source: Annex 2, Framework 
(2014), p. 4. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-
justice/files/com_2014_158_annexes_en.pdf [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
 
3.3.3 How is the rule of law defined? 
The first explicit reference to the rule of law was made in the Preamble of the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Since the Amsterdam Treaty, the rule of law has 
been mentioned in substantially the same way as the current Article 2 of the 
TEU. 
Currently, the EC is adhering to a substantial approach to the rule of 
law, held most notably by the ECJ and the ECtHR as well. Values such as 
democracy and fundamental rights are essential within the EC understanding 
of the rule of law.101 Also noteworthy, is a direct reference to the VC’s work 
on the definition of the rule of law. The definition set out by the VC is put in 
direct relation to Article 2 TEU.102  
 
                                                
101 Framework (2014), p.4. 
102 Ibid. 
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The EC is inter alia referring to a non-exhaustive list of principles provided 
by the VC, intended to “[…] define the core meaning of the rule of law as a 
common value of the EU in accordance with Article 2 TEU.” 
Those principles include legality, which implies a transparent, 
accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal 
certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; independent 
and impartial courts; effective judicial review including respect for 
fundamental rights; and equality before the law.103 
In a way, the EU does indirectly define the rule of law by referring to 
the definition(s) set out by the VC.104 What is also remarkable is that the 
mandate of defining the rule of law is partly put in the hands of experts 
working for an advisory body of another regional organisation.  
Furthermore, the ECJ has a crucial role being the final arbiter in 
interpreting the EU treaties - it shall “[…] ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed.”.105 Since the establishment 
of the court, the ECJ has been developing the EU jurisprudence and given 
concrete meaning to the articles, sometimes accused for judicial activism.106 
An important landmark is the 1986 judgement “Les verts”, where the ECJ 
stated that the EU is "based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither its Member 
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the 
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic Constitutional 
Charter, the Treaty".107 
The Commission has developed a set of principles that are based on, 
and intended to summarise the case law of the ECJ in respect to the rule of 
law. The principles are: (a) the principle of legality108, (b) legal certainty109, 
(c) prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers110, (d) independent 
and effective judicial review, including respect for fundamental rights111, (e) 
                                                
103 Ibid.. 
104 The formulation “definition(s)” was used to highlight that the work by the Venice 
Commission on the rule of law is an ongoing project. In other words, their understanding of 
the rule of law is not a static one, but develops over time. Numerous documents on the rule 
of law have been published that led to the most recent Rule of Law Checklist from 2016, 
which will be discussed in the coming part.  
105 Article 19 TEU. 
106 For an extensive account of the ECJ’s supposed judicial activism, see Dawson, Mark, et 
al, Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice, Northampton: Edward Elgar 
publishing, 2013. 
107 Case 294/83, "Les Verts" v European Parliament, [1986] ECR 01339, para 23. 
108 Case C-496/99 P, Commission v CAS Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I-03801, para 63.  
109 Joined cases 212 to 217/80 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Salumi [1981] 
ECR 2735, para 10.  
110 Joined cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v Commission [1989] ECR 02859, para 19. 
111 Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council, para 91; 
Case C-550/09 E and F, [2010] ECR I-06213, para 44; Case C-50/00 P Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores [2002] ECR I-06677, para 38 and 39. 
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separation of powers112, and (f) equality before the law113.114 Worth noting is 
that principle (d) makes a direct reference to the ECHR, and the general 
commitment to the CoE and its court is also reiterated in the same annex.115 
3.4 Conclusion 
Soft law tools, such as political dialogues, tend to incorporate immediate 
threats to unity and cooperation in Europe, as a threat to the rule of law. Hard 
law, such as the treaties are too vague when referring to the rule of law, 
abstaining from definition, thus leaving it to other EU bodies, such as the EC 
and the ECJ, which have an explicitly substantive understanding of the rule 
of law. 
When a threat to the rule of law is of a systemic nature, it implies that 
the threats may be so severe that there is no political will to address them. 
This forces the EU116 to fall back on empty threats of activating the “nuclear 
option” Article 7 TEU. The threats are empty since they cannot be envisaged 
in the current context. Subsequently, the Framework runs the risk of falling 
flat in terms of achieving a higher degree of rule of law adherence. Another 
question worth mentioning is what impact triggering Article 7 would have on 
the rule of law in a Member State – it might be a double-edged sword in the 
sense that the situation might just deteriorate even more. 
What the EC means with a systemic threat to the rule of law can be used 
to create a negative definition, and hence a good measurement, of the 
boundaries of the rule of law in the eyes of the EC. 
It seems that the EU is trying to become a guardian of the ‘common 
values’ and hence a sovereign mechanism to respond to threats to the rule of 
law and other values/principles in the member states. An “EU rule of law 
commission” has been proposed by various scholars, which would bear 
similarities with the VC, but also have a possibility of conducting country 
visits for monitoring purposes.117 Whether this is a feasible idea in the current 
context remains to be seen. 
 
                                                
112 Joined cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v Commission, 
[2000] ECR I- 00001, para 17 and Case C-279/09 DEB, [2010] ECR I-13849, para 58. 
113 Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission [2010] 
ECR I-08301, para 54. 
114 Cases and principles from Annex 1 to Framework (2014), pp. 1-2. For another extensive 
list of cases between Sept. 2002-2008 with references to the rule of law, see the annex of 
Pech (2009). 
115 Annex 1, Framework (2014), pp. 2-3. 
116 Most notably via the EC and the EP. 
117 Bárd (2016) pp. 82-87. 
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4 The Council of Europe and 
the rule of law 
4.1 Introduction 
The founding treaty of the Council of Europe (CoE) establishes the rule of 
law as one of three core values, together with democracy and human rights.118 
The rule of law is explicitly mentioned twice; in the preamble where it is 
stated as a basis for ‘genuine democracy’, and in Article 3 where member 
states, by signing the treaty, affirm their sincere cooperation with the CoE in 
relation to the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Adherence to Article 3 is a precondition for becoming a member, and does 
also bear importance for becoming an associate member.119 Serious violation 
of Article 3 may result in suspension of rights of representation in the 
Committee of Ministers, pursuant to Article 8 of the statute.  
All 47 member states of the CoE have ratified The ECHR, that also 
establishes the ECtHR.120 The preamble of the ECHR is the only place in the 
convention where the rule of law is explicitly referred to; the member states 
“[…] which are like-minded and have a common heritage of […] the rule of 
law […]”. 
The CoE has numerous commissions, commissioners, consultative 
bodies and common standards and policies that all in some way are working 
with rule of law adherence in its’ member states and neighbouring states.121 
In this part, the work by the Venice Commission (VC) will be particularly 
focused upon. The work by other bodies, and case law of the ECtHR, will be 
referred to when considered relevant. 
4.2 How does the CoE define the rule of 
law?  
Notwithstanding the fact that the rule of law is widely referred to in political 
documents, conventions and recommendations throughout the various CoE 
bodies, a definition is not to be found in those texts. There is also no 
monitoring mechanism that specifically deals with rule of law issues, but it is 
in a way done through the different bodies within the CoE, where each body 
has a specific purpose. For example, monitoring on corruption issues, as being 
performed via The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), is 
                                                
118 Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5.V.1949. 
119 See Article 4-5 of the Statute of the Council of Europe. 
120 See Article 19 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, Rome, 4.XI. 1950 (ECHR). 
121 This includes, inter alia, CEPEJ, CCJE, CCPE, the Venice Commission, CDCP, 
GRECO and MONEYCAL. Out of time and resource reasons, every body will not be 
accounted for, but further research into the organisation of the CoE is accessible on this 
link: http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/rule-of-law. 
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considered a part of the gathered approach towards rule of law promotion.122 
In other words, the CoE defines the rule of law through how it is being 
implemented in the various sub-organs and its Court judgements.  
In some instances, efforts have been made to approach what the concept 
of the rule of law encompasses for the CoE. In a 2007 resolution by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE), the problem of different 
languages in understanding a concept that is supposed to be a common value 
was discussed, and ended by a call for further assistance by the VC.123 
The VC built on this call for assistance in its 2011 Report on the rule of 
law.124 The Report concluded that the rule of law concept has not been as 
developed as the other two pillars of the CoE, democracy and human rights, 
and that legal provisions mentioning the rule of law are general and lack 
specificity. An attempt was made to materialise what substantial elements the 
rule of law is conceived of. A formalistic concept of the rule of law that only 
requires that state action is authorised by law was considered ‘distorted’ - the 
VC seems instead to have aligned their understanding with the substantial 
conception by Tom Bingham, whose views were briefly presented in the first 
chapter.125  
The following chapters will present what tools the CoE has when a state 
is not complying to the organisation’s fundamental values, and a new rule of 
law checklist adopted by the VC. 
 
4.2.1 The “Nuclear” option(s) 
The CoE has an article similar to Article 7 TEU, which concerns the effect of 
serious violations against the rule of law. Article 8 establishes that any CoE 
member state “[…] which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended 
from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers 
to withdraw […]”. Article 3 is an essential paragraph, establishing a principle 
of sincere cooperation in respect to upholding the CoE core values, such as 
the rule of law. 
Another Article of the same kind is Article 46 of the ECHR, which 
concerns member state compliance with ECtHR judgements. Article 46(4) 
establishes a process for handling a situation where a member state is refusing 
to implement an ECtHR judgement: 
 
If the Committee of Ministers considers that a High Contracting Party refuses to abide by a 
final judgment in a case to which it is a party, it may, after serving formal notice on that Party 
and by decision adopted by a majority vote of two-thirds of the representatives entitled to sit 
on the committee, refer to the Court the question whether that Party has failed to fulfil its 
obligation under paragraph 1.  
                                                
122 The Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) is the Council of Europe anti-
corruption body. From ‘about’ on http://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/about-greco/priority-
for-the-coe; “As it is emphasised in the Criminal Law Convention, corruption threatens the 
rule of law, democracy and human rights, undermines good governance, fairness and social 
justice, distorts competition, hinders economic development and endangers the stability of 
democratic institutions and the moral foundations of society.”. 
123 Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), Resolution 1594 (2007).  
124 Venice Commission, Report on the Rule of Law, CDL-AD(2011)003rev. 
125 Ibid., p. 9. 
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According to Article 46(5), the ECtHR can then examine the case, and if a 
violation against the principle of abiding ECtHR judgements in Article 46(1) 
is found, the case is referred to the Committee of Ministers. Since this process 
has never been exhausted, it is not completely clear what such a procedure 
could result in. For example, the Committee of Ministers could activate the 
‘nuclear option’ in Article 8 of the CoE statute. This has however never been 
the case, for the same reasons discussed in the chapter about the EU. 
There is no specific expert mechanism that deals with member state 
compliance with binding judgements by the ECtHR. As we have seen, the 
executive organ of the CoE – the Committee of Ministers is in charge of this 
process by the provisions in Article 46 ECHR.126 Additionally, The 
Committee of Ministers arranges four “DH-meetings” every year, where 
execution of ECtHR judgements are being supervised in the form of a 
dialogue between Member States, that results in a final resolution.127 The 
dialogues should be seen as a tool for creating political pressure against states 
who fail to implement ECtHR judgements. 
As mentioned, the nuclear option found in Article 8 of the CoE statute 
has never been activated and neither has Article 46 ECHR been fully 
exhausted. One case has however the potential of triggering such a process – 
Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan.128 The ECtHR found that the arrest of the 
regime critical Mr. Mammadov was unjustified, carried out in bad faith and 
that his right to presumption of innocence had been breached and thus 
violated several articles of the ECHR and the rule of law. Moreover, the court 
found that Mr. Mammadov should be immediately released. To this day129, 
Mr. Mammadov remains imprisoned, contrary to the ECtHR judgement. The 
case has been highlighted by Thorbjørn Jagland, Secretary General of the 
CoE, in a statement on 29 April 2016, urging the Azerbaijan courts to follow 
its commitments under the ECHR.130 Numerous similar cases in Azerbaijan 
display a systematic disregard of CoE core values and judgements of the 
ECtHR.131 Whether the Committee of Ministers will ultimately decide to 
suspend or detach Azerbaijan from the CoE remains to be seen. How such a 
measure would improve adherence to values such as the rule of law, 
democracy and human rights is unclear. What is however clear, is that 
political pressure seems to this day to not be a very effective tool towards 
                                                
126 See Article 46(2) ECHR. 
127 See: http://www.coe.int/en/web/cm/execution-judgments. 
128 Case of Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, (Application no.15172/13), Judgement, 
Strasbourg, 22 May 2014, Final 13/10/2014. 
129 23 May 2017. 
130 http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/full-news/-
/asset_publisher/VN6cYYbQB4QE/content/jagland-azerbaijan-court-decision-on-ilgar-
mammadov-deeply-disturbing- [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. See also European Parliament 
resolution P7_TA-PROV(2013)0285, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201306/20130620ATT68102/2013
0620ATT68102EN.pdf. 
131 http://www.coe.int/hu/web/commissioner/-/azerbaijan-stop-reprisals-against-human-
rights-defenders. [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. It should be noted that Azerbaijan is not the 
only member state showing this development, but similar trends have been noted in, inter 
alia, Turkey, Russia, Hungary and Ukraine.  
 33 
states with a negative attitude towards these values. It is worth noting that in 
the CoE context, there is no economical sanctioning mechanism. 
4.2.2 The Venice Commission  
The European Commission for Democracy through Law, commonly referred 
to as the ‘Venice Commission’132, is a CoE advisory body on constitutional 
matters for its 61 member states.133 The Venice Commission (VC) was 
created in 1990 in the aftermath of the fallen Berlin Wall, a time when need 
for constitutional reform amongst numerous European States was high. To 
present the VC with its methods and key components is relevant for 
understanding in what context the rule of law checklist exists.134 
The three broad areas with which the VC works with are (1) democratic 
institutions and fundamental rights, (2) constitutional justice and ordinary 
justice and (3) elections, referendums and political parties.135 The activity is 
based on the three core values of the CoE – democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law. It is performed in cooperation with the CoE secretariat. The VC 
became a part of the CoE though a partial agreement, but is an independent 
body that works on its own initiative.136 
According to Article 2(1) of the statute, each member state shall appoint 
one independent expert and one substitute who has “[…] achieved eminence 
through their experience in democratic institutions or by their contribution to 
the enhancement of law and political science.” Amongst high judges, 
professors in international law and ombudsmen one can also find former 
prime ministers, justice ministers and high prosecutors.137  
The main task for the VC is to issue opinions on legislation or draft 
legislation. A request for an opinion can come from the member state itself, 
from the CoE or from other international organisations such as the EU and 
the OSCE. The majority of requests do however come from the member states 
themselves. The European Court of  Human Rights (ECtHR) can request 
Amicus curiae briefs from the VC, which means that the VC can, in relation 
                                                
132 The name stems from the fact that the experts meet four times per year in Venice in 
plenum. 
133 The member states are Algeria, Brasilia, Chile, Israel, Korea, Kirgizstan, Kosovo, 
Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Tunisia, Kazakhstan, USA and the 47 member states to the CoE. 
Belarus is an associated member. Argentina, Canada, The Holy See, Japan and Uruguay are 
observer states. See: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/members/countries.aspx?lang=EN [Accessed 23 May 
12:00]. 
134 Some parts of this chapter concerning the VC working methods has been vaguely 
translated from a previous article in Swedish written by undersigned, called 
“Venedigkommissionens framgångar – vad beror de på?”, during an internship at the 
Permanent Representation of Sweden to the Council of Europe. 
135 See Article 1 of the statute (Resolution(2002)3). For an overall presentation on the VC, 
see: http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_Presentation&lang=EN [Accessed 
23 May 12:00]. 
136 The latest statute of the VC is Resolution(2002)3, adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 21 February 2002. Link: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_01_Statute. 
137 For more information on budget and other matters, see the VC’s own website, that 
provides all information on structure of organisation etc.  
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to a case, provide views on interpretation matters, or information on a 
situation in a member state.138  
The VC initiates its work by receiving a draft of a changed constitution 
or other legislation by a member state, the CoE or another international 
organisation. The CoE secretariat then forms working group consisting of 
experts and rapporteurs to prepare a draft opinion, where international 
standards as well as national legislation relevant for the state in question is 
considered. Expertise, knowledge of language and of the legal culture are 
attributes that are considered when forming the working group. Country visits 
can be a part of the process, where the working group meets not only with 
relevant authorities and government officials, but also representatives for 
other interests, such as the civil society, the political opposition and NGO’s.  
A final draft opinion is prepared, that thenceforth is discussed in a 
plenary session in Venice between the experts. After the draft has been 
adopted, it is sent to the one who requested it and is published on the VC 
website. The VC is today a well-regarded and trusted institution in the eyes 
of the international community. In some member states, it has almost become 
a standard procedure to consult the VC for future major legislative changes 
within the VC’s mandate.  
Below, some key components in what could be the recipe for success 
will be laid out and lastly the new rule of law checklist will be accounted 
for.139  
The VC strives to create a dialogue between its experts and officials 
from the member state in question. This dialogue can be presumed to create 
mutual understanding between VC experts and government officials, which 
could consequently improve the opportunity for opinions to be implemented. 
Another cornerstone in the VC’s practise is cooperation with other 
international organisations. Opinions are often adopted jointly with the OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) or the EC. 
The EC also funds activities and encourage candidates for EU accession to 
turn to the VC for advice in different matters.140 Another key element for 
success is the flexibility in the organisation. The VC works on an ad hoc-basis 
and can therefore swiftly react to political crises.141 It has been pointed out 
that holding the plenary sessions in Scuola Grande di San Giovanni 
                                                
138 For a more detailed account of the process from request to opinion, see link: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=01_activities&lang=EN. This thesis does 
only give a limited account of the working process [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
139 All information stated in the text below is taken from the VC website, that describes its 
practices. For deeper information on the inner workings of the VC, these articles provides 
good insights and will be referred to when needed: Iain Cameron, Johan Hirschfeldt, 2016, 
Om Venedigkommissionen — uppdrag, arbetssätt och resultat, Svensk Juristtidning 100 år, 
Justus förlag, Henceforth ‘Cameron (2016)’, and Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, 2014, The 
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe – Standards and Impact, The European 
Journal of International Law Vol. 25 no. 2, Oxford University Press, Henceforth ‘Hoffmann 
(2014)’. 
140 Cameron (2016), p. 408. 
141 This is mentioned in the preamble of the VC statute. See for example VC opinions on 
the situation in Turkey after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/? pdf=CDL-REF(2016)061-e & 
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/? pdf=CDL-AD(2016)037-e. [Accessed 23 
May 12:00] 
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Evangelista in Venice bears a non-negligible attractiveness for the experts to 
make available their knowledge, as well having ministers and government 
representatives visiting Venice and exposing themselves to the experts’ 
review.142  
Other attributes that should be ascribed to the VC are quality, tone and 
argumentation. Given that their opinions are not binding, but foremost advice 
and possibly ‘soft law’, a good diplomatic tone is essential. The VC shows a 
good understanding of the purpose of a new legislation and often presents 
alternative solutions that are more coherent with the CoE’s core values. The 
high quality and argumentation that emanates from the distinguished 
members and a good organisation, is an effective method that encourages the 
state in question to respect the recommendations. Even if a recommendation 
is not implemented, it still has some effect by, for instance, supporting the 
opposition or becoming a basis on further pressure from the EC.143 
The VC gets support for its opinions from other sources as well. While 
the opinions are not legally binding, the basis for the opinions are always 
binding legislation, such as the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR. Best 
practices are also identified, which are used as guidance in, for instance, rule 
of law matters, both within the VC but also for other member states.144 The 
ECtHR also occasionally refers to VC opinions in its judgements, as a part of 
the court’s argumentation.145 This trust in the VC is shared by the ECJ, that 
has referred to VC opinions as well.146 Whether there exists a certain cross-
fertilization between the VC and the ECtHR remains unclear, but it has been 
argued in the research discourse.147 It is, for example, a fact that there is a 
certain exchange of personnel between the two institutions.148 
There is no systematic follow-up mechanism after opinions have been 
adopted. However, the Secretariat does have a brief information point on this 
matter during each plenary session. Member states do not always live up to 
the opinions – between 2009 and 2012 “[…] in many instances the relevant 
state did not take up the recommendations contained in opinions, at least not 
in a way that was noticed by the VC.”149  
 
                                                
142 Cameron (2016), p. 409. 
143 Cameron (2016), p. 410. 
144 Hoffmann (2014), p. 581. 
145 By mid-2016 the ECtHR has referred to VC opinions over 100 times, on various matters 
such as elections, the judiciary, political parties, freedom of religion and freedom of 
assembly. See link: 
http://www.venice.coe.int/WebForms/pages/?p=02_references&lang=EN. [Accessed 23 
May 12:00]. 
146 See Bode-Kirchhoff, ‘Why the Road from Luxembourg to Strasbourg Leads Through 
Venice’, in K. Dzehtsiarou et al. (eds), Human Rights Law in Europe: The Influence, 
Overlaps and Contradictions of the EU and ECHR (2014) 55, at sect. III. From note 29 in 
Hoffmann (2014). 
147 van Dijk, Pieter, ‘The Venice Commission on Certain Aspects of the European 
Convention of Human Rights Ratione Personae’, in S. Breitenmoser et al. (eds), Human 
Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law: Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (2007), p. 183.  
148 Hoffmann (2014), p. 587. 
149 In approximately one third of the cases the VC has no information about reactions to 
opinions by the states concerned.  See: Hoffmann (2014), p. 589. 
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4.2.3 The Rule of Law Checklist 
The VC ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ is a recent addition to understanding the VC 
approach to the rule of law, and hence the understanding of other international 
organisations.150 The checklist was adopted on 18 March 2016 and has 
thenceforth been supported by, inter alia, the Committee of Ministers, PACE, 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. This document 
holds implications for both how international organisations work with rule of 
law monitoring in national states, and serves as a guidance tool for nation 
states themselves. It is meant to develop the 2011 report on the rule of law 
that was mentioned above, and a first version of the checklist that was 
appended to that report.151  
The checklist is structured in three parts. The first part, ‘purpose and 
scope’ explains the important place of the rule of law in international 
organisations such as the CoE, the UN and the EU. It also recaps how the rule 
of law was defined in the 2011 report and sets out what added value the 
checklist has – to “[…] build on these developments and to provide a tool for 
assessing the Rule of Law in a given country from the view point of its 
constitutional and legal structures, the legislation in force and the existing 
case-law. The checklist aims at enabling an objective, thorough, transparent 
and equal assessment.”152 Human rights, democracy and rule of law are 
expressed to be interlinked.153  
The connection with human rights and democracy is elaborated upon in 
the second chapter, called “benchmarks”. It is conveyed that Article 8 ECHR 
(Right to respect for private and family life) and case law has developed 
specific positive obligations of a state, that are combined with the rule of 
law.154 The rule of law is expressed to not per se create positive obligations 
for a state, but it does entail certain principles relevant for human rights 
protection which creates the link between the two. 
 
                                                
150 European Commission for Democracy through law (Venice Comission) Rule of Law 
Checklist, Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th Plenary Session (Venice, 11-12 
March 2016). Henceforth ‘Rule of law checklist’ or ‘checklist’. The 2016 rule of law 
checklist is made in cooperation with several experts, the Birmingham Centre for the Rule 
of Law, the secretariats of the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE), the 
European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities and the Group of States against Corruption 
(GRECO), as well as of OSCE/ODIHR and of the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA). See checklist, p. 7.  
151 Report on the Rule of Law (CDL-AD(2011)003rev). 
152 Rule of Law checklist, point 24. 
153 Rule of Law checklist, point 31: “The Rule of Law would just be an empty shell without 
permitting access to human rights. Vice- versa, the protection and promotion of human 
rights are realised only through respect for the Rule of Law: a strong regime of Rule of Law 
is vital to the protection of human rights. In addition, the Rule of Law and several human 
rights (such as fair trial and freedom of expression) overlap. While recognising that the 
Rule of Law can only be fully realised in an environment that protects human rights, the 
checklist will expressly deal with human rights only when they are linked to specific 
aspects of the Rule of Law.” In point 33 the link to democracy is made clear as well. 
154 Rule of law checklist, point 36. See also ECtHR cases: Sylvester v. Austria, 36812/97 
and 40104/98, 24 April 2003, § 63; P.P. v. Poland, 8677/03, 8 January 2008, § 88. 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“[…] the Rule of Law principle creates additional obligations of the State to guarantee that 
individuals under their jurisdiction have access to effective legal means to enforce the 
protection of their human rights, in particular in situations when private actors infringe these 
rights. Thus the Rule of Law creates a benchmark for the quality of laws protecting human 
rights: legal provisions in this field – and beyond – have to be, inter alia, clear and 
predictable, and non-discriminatory, and they must be applied by independent courts under 
procedural guarantees equivalent to those applied in conflicts resulting from interferences 
with human rights by public authorities.”155 
 
The incorporation of human rights in the understanding of rule of law is seen 
as a historical development.156 The link to democracy is also made clear in 
the beginning of the second chapter. Rule of law “[…] promotes democracy 
by establishing accountability of those wielding public power […]”.157 
Balance of power is another value that the checklist addresses.158 
The second chapter goes on to present a number of questions that can 
be used to assess the degree of rule of law adherence in a state. It is divided 
into nine areas with sub-areas: legality, legal certainty, prevention of abuse 
(misuse) of powers, equality before that law and non-discrimination, access 
to justice, and examples of particular challenges to the rule of law. The 
structure is (generally) built up upon a question on whether a certain principle 
that is relevant to the rule of law, is recognised in a state. After the question(s) 
it follows a text explaining why the principle is important as well as a 
reference to several norms of different kind. The third chapter is a selection 
of standards that have been used to create the benchmarks, and consists of 
hard law and soft law relating to each sub-area in the benchmark chapter. 
The VC recognizes cultural and constitutional diversity and hence that 
implementation of the rule of law does not have to be identical in order to 
fulfil this “global idea and inspiration”, however stressing the fact that the 
main components should remain the same.159 
There is no simple and short definition of the rule of law in the checklist, 
though this question is referred back to the 2011 report. By reading the report 
as well as chapter three (selected standards), one can grasp what sort of 
approach the VC utilises when assessing rule of law adherence. 
4.3 Conclusion 
The CoE remains committed to the rule of law by constantly developing 
guidance for Member States on how to benchmark rule of law levels as well 
as monitoring state practise by its various sub-organs. Political will and 
attitude from the member state itself seems however to be what is most crucial 
for achieving change. This maturity might not always exist in countries with 
an authoritative government, or with a history of authoritative government. 
One way for improvement could be to further develop the follow-up process, 
and/or to intensify cooperation with the EC. An important fact is that states 
                                                
155 Rule of law checklist, point 36. 
156 Rule of law checklist, point 35. 
157 Rule of law checklist, point 33. 
158 Rule of law checklist, point 39. 
159 This idea is foremost conveyed in point 34 & 36 in the Rule of law checklist. 
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are more inclined to follow VC opinions if they are referred to as a step in 
avoiding infringement procedures from the EC.160  
                                                
160 Hoffmann (2014), p. 594. 
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5 Efforts combined  
5.1 The Polish example  
A part of the “renewed” interest for upholding the rule of law in Europe most 
likely stems from recent member state actions being perceived as threatening 
the rule of law as a common value in Europe and hence, compliance with 
Article 2 TEU and Acticle 3 of the CoE statute.161 In other words, Europe’s 
regional organisations are working in the context of a perceived backlash to 
constitutional principles in several of its member states. Development in 
neighbouring states to the EU, such as in Russia and Turkey probably also 
adds to these concerns. In the CoE, these states are important member 
states.162 We have seen how the historical development of this term is 
manifested today in Europe’s regional organisations. Below, some EU and 
CoE actions to alleged rule of law threats in Poland during years 2015-2017 
will be used as further material for exploring how the EU and the CoE163 
works in practice with strengthening the rule of law.164 
Poland’s adoption of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal of 25 June 
2015 (with amendments on 22 December 2015) has been a cause for worry 
for both the EU and the CoE, and caused the EC to trigger the new EU 
Framework. Another issue that was addressed by the new framework is a new 
“small media law” that allegedly modifies the rules for the appointment of the 
Management and Supervisory Boards of the public service broadcasters, 
putting them under the control of the Treasury Minister, rather than an 
independent body. The new law also provided for the immediate dismissal of 
the existing Supervisory and Management Boards. 
These new laws led to action from the EU consisting in activation of 
the new EU Framework. The EC and First Vice-President Timmermans 
sought additional information about the two new laws, and Poland was 
recommended to request a legal assessment from the VC on 23 December 
2015. Poland followed with such a request, but continued with the legislative 
process, and answered concerning the new media law that it did not cause any 
negative impact on media pluralism, on 7 January 2016. The same month, the 
EU College of Commissioners held a first orientation debate in order to assess 
the situation in Poland in line with the new rule of law framework.165  
Based on the debate, the EC adopted an opinion concerning the rule of 
law in Poland on 1 June 2016.  The concerns in the opinion were focused 
                                                
161 See previous chapter three and four. 
162 With ‘important’ it is referred to the fact that these states are big economic contributors 
to the CoE budget. See link: https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/budget?desktop=false 
[Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
163 Foremost via the European Commission and the Venice Commission. 
164 The content of these tools is based on the organisations’ understanding of the rule of 
law. When determining a threat to the rule of law, it is essential that the rule of law is 
defined. As we have seen, this is an ongoing process, but it is also based on the 
development in the academia. 
165 For a more extensive account of these events, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-62_en.htm [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
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mainly on three issues: the appointment of judges to the Constitutional 
Tribunal, the Act of 22 December 2015 amending the law on the 
Constitutional Tribunal and the effectiveness of the Constitutional review of 
new legislation.166  
The cause for concerns for the appointment of judges to the 
Constitutional Tribunal in the fall/winter of 2015, in regard of the rule of law, 
were in the opinion the following.167 The outgoing legislature held that five 
new judges should be appointed; three in line with the outgoing legislature 
and two in line with the incoming legislature which commenced on 12 
November 2015. However, amendments to the law on the Constitutional 
Tribunal were quickly adopted in the meantime that introduced the possibility 
to annul the judicial nominations made by the previous legislature and to 
instead nominate five new judges. In contradiction with rulings of the 
Constitutional Tribunal on the matter on 3 and 9 December 2015, which 
upheld the previous nominations, the President appointed these five new 
judges, thus creating the issue of concern. In addition, the amendments also 
shortened the terms of office of the President and Vice-President of the 
Tribunal from nine to three years, with the previous terms coming to an 
automatic end within three months of the amendment's adoption. The 
Constitutional Tribunal declared the shortening of the terms invalid. 
Moreover, in the way mentioned in the previous part, the functioning 
of the Constitutional Tribunal was modified by a new law amending the law 
on the Constitutional Tribunal, on 22 December 2015. Although the Polish 
Government requested an opinion from the VC, the law was by the Polish 
Parliament published in the Official Journal and entered into force on 28 
December 2015. The amendments were criticised by the VC in its 11 March 
2016 opinion to pose threats to the rule of law, but also democracy and human 
rights:  
 
Crippling the Tribunal’s effectiveness will undermine all three basic principles of the Council 
of Europe: democracy – because of an absence of a central part of checks and balances; 
human rights – because the access of individuals to the Constitutional Tribunal could be 
slowed down to a level resulting in the denial of justice; and the rule of law – because the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which is a central part of the Judiciary in Poland, would become 
ineffective. Making a constitutional court ineffective is inadmissible and this removes a 
crucial mechanism which ensures that potential conflicts with European and international 
norms and standards can be resolved at the national level without the need to have recourse 
to European or other subsidiary courts, which are overburdened and less close to the realities 
on the ground.168 
 
A ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal on 9 March 2016, deeming the 
amendments to be unconstitutional, was refused to be published in the official 
journal. This together with the material substance of the amendments, was 
another cause of worry for the EC expressed in its opinion. The opinion also 
included inquiries about new laws, such as the “small media law”. On 13 
April 2016, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in 
                                                
166 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2015_en.htm [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
167 For a more extensive account of the opinion, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-16-2017_en.htm [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
168 Venice Commission, CDL-AD(2016)001, Opinion on amendments to the act of 25 june 
2015 on the constitutional tribunal of Poland, point 138.  
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Poland, urging the Polish government to follow both the EC and VC 
opinion.169 
Since no viable solution was found in the dialogue with Poland 
regarding these concerns, the second stage of the new EU framework was 
subsequently initiated. On 27 July 2016, the EC adopted a recommendation 
on the rule of law in Poland, formally activating the second stage in the new 
EU Framework.170 In the recommendation, it was made clear that the EC 
believes that there were clear systemic threats to the rule of law in Poland that 
require urgent actions.171 The main indication of this is expressed in the fact 
that the Constitutional Tribunal cannot effectively exercise its core task of 
constitutional review, which is considered a “key component of the rule of 
law”.172 The EC recommended Poland to urgently follow its 
recommendations, addressing the same issues as were expressed in the 
opinion; to respect and implement the judgements of the Constitutional 
Tribunal of 3 and 9 December 2015 as well as other judgements, without the 
interference of the government, and also to follow the VC opinion stressing 
the Constitutional Tribunal as the guarantor of the Constitution, which means 
that future legal review should also be fully implemented.173 
As a result of the criticism on the amendments on 22 December 2015 
on the act on the Constitutional tribunal, a new act was signed by the President 
of Poland on 27 July 2016. The VC adopted a new opinion on 14 October 
2016 which refers to the new act on the Constitutional Tribunal.174 It is worth 
noting that the Polish Government declined to send a representative to the 
session where this opinion was adopted.175 In the opinion, the VC examined 
whether, and to what extent, the recommendations in its previous 11 March 
opinion was followed via the Act of 22 July 2016.176 As we know, Poland had 
been criticised for unbalancing the separation of powers via its amendments 
to the Act on the Constitutional tribunal, and thus posing serious threats for 
the independence of the Tribunal, which was deemed inconsistent with the 
rule of law. The new Act of 22 July 2016 was believed to contain some 
improvements, albeit ‘very limited’.177 For example, the VC pointed out that 
previous judgements by the Tribunal are still not respected and the 
appointment of judges is still not in accordance with the rule of law.178 
Consequently, the VC found in its concluding remarks, that the rule of law 
issue was far from solved in Poland with respect to the Constitutional tribunal. 
                                                
169 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-
0123&language=EN&ring=B8-2016-0461 [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
170 European Commission, C(2016) 5703 final, Brussels, 27.7.2016, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/files/recommendation-rule-of-law-poland-
20160727_en.pdf. Henceforth ‘Commission Recommendation on the Rule of law in 
Poland’. Press releases: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2643_en.htm & 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-2644_en.htm [Accessed 23 May 12:00]. 
171 Commission Recommendation on the Rule of law in Poland., p. 21. 
172 Ibid., p. 20. 
173 Ibid., p. 21. 
174 Venice Commission, Poland opinion CDL-AD(2016)026, on the act on the 
Constitutional Tribunal. 
175 Ibid., point 8. 
176 Ibid.., point 20. 
177 For the substantial improvements and limitations, see Ibid.., point 122-123. 
178 Ibid.., point 125. 
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Throughout the 14 October Opinion, the VC refers to the Rule of Law 
checklist as it is a ‘central standard’.179 
On 21 December 2016, the EC issued a press release presenting the 
latest developments in the dialogue with Poland as well as a complementary 
Recommendation.180 In summary, the EC expressed that there was an urgent 
continuous systemic threat to the rule of law, that had not been resolved. 
Among a repetition of the previous recommendations, the Polish government 
was recommended to “[…] refrain from actions and public statements which 
could undermine the legitimacy and efficiency of the Constitutional 
Tribunal”. The EC also recalled Poland to take the VC opinion of 14 October 
2016 fully into account. A two month frame was given to Poland to respond 
to the new recommendation. Where not satisfactory follow-up would be given 
within the set time limit, the EC expressed that it “[…] has the discretion 
whether or not to resort to the procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU.”. Up to 
this date, it remains to be seen how this situation will develop.181 
5.2 Conclusion 
As far as different approaches are concerned, the EC and the VC speak with 
different voices, nevertheless addressing the same issues. The VC 
communicates with a more technical and diplomatic voice, giving 
recommendations and acting as an advisor. The EC has a rather political tone, 
not refraining from threats and often reliant upon the VC’s analysis as a 
source of authority, due to the vast expertise of the VC. Whether this gives 
rise to cross-fertilisation or merely a complementary mechanism is a difficult 
enterprise to discern. There is more evidence that the nature of this 
cooperation is a complementary order. Besides reputation as a respectable 
institution, the VC does not gain as much to its work from the EC as vice 
versa. The EC on the other hand has referred member states to following VC 
opinions as a way of avoiding infringement procedures and hence financial 
penalties. The VC, and the CoE at large, do not have any concrete financial 
penalties. This is most likely due to the different nature of the two 
organisations. The EU is however more and more approaching the CoE in 
terms of what values to guard and highlight, and therefore cooperation 
between the two seem natural. As overlapping is a waste of resources, the 
organisations should draw upon their respective expertise. The EU has more 
leverage, while the CoE has more expertise on guarding fundamental values. 
Complete overlapping is not possible, since the CoE has more member states, 
and it is also for this reason that mutual enforcement is not completely 
possible. Therefore, it is sometimes necessary to concretely appropriate some 
attributes that are positive. How this could be done will be presented in the 
final section. The strongest asset of the EU is its leverage and intense political 
                                                
179 See point 9 where the rule of law checklist is mentioned as a ‘central standard’, Venice 
Commission, Poland opinion CDL-AD(2016)026, on the act on the Constitutional Tribunal.  
180 Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4476_en.htm. [Accessed 23 
May 12:00]. See also: Commission Recommendation of 21.12.2016 regarding the rule of 
law in Poland complementary to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374, Brussels, 
21.12.2016 C(2016) 8950 final. 
181 23 May 2017. 
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cooperation.182 The strongest asset of the VC is its history of working on the 
rule of law, argumentation and expertise through its staff.183 Other best 
practices that can be derived from the new EU Framework is the consequent 
follow-up procedure that the VC lacks in its work. On the other hand, the EU 
Framework does not mandate country visits (and expert dialogues) for 
monitoring purposes, contrary to the VC. The new EU framework has proved 
to be an important addition to what can be considered as an ‘early prevention 
mechanism’ to threats to the rule of law, together with the already well 
established VC.184 The question is however whether both of these procedures 
act early enough, and ultimately begs the question whether it is possible to 
act in any other way than ex post facto from an international organisation’s 
point of view. 
This section has hopefully served to demonstrate how the tools of the 
regional organisations are implemented and work in practice. The EC via the 
new EU Framework and the VC play important parts in adding pressure to 
the Member States to comply with the rule of law. The “constitutional crisis” 
in Poland has showed the fragility of separation of powers and the rule of law. 
Whether these regional organisations are capable of achieving more than just 
political pressure in this particular situation remains to be seen. Ultimately, 
the EU threat of triggering Article 7 TEU might in the Polish case be an empty 
one; it is not considered favourable in an unstable time, having the United 
Kingdom in formal proceedings of leaving the EU since the UK Government 
triggered Article 50 TEU on 29 March 2017. Pressure from regional 
organisations, NGOs and political opposition, play an important role in the 
context of a backlash to the rule of law.185 Without political will, this might 
however remain solely as a futile exercise. 
                                                
182 And after all more uniformity in views that the more diverse collection of member states 
to the CoE. 
183 “Because the VC is an institution with a high standing and a pluralistic composition, it 
can be very motivating for states that lack any tradition or experience with democracy and 
the rule of law, yet are trying to spur it to receive specific suggestions on regulations from 
the VC pursuant to a request.53 Such suggestions can be interpreted and applied in the 
country concerned as a sort of certification that compliance with the rule of law has been 
examined. This can facilitate the elaboration of specific norms and increase their 
acceptance at home.”, Hoffmann (2014), p. 591. 
184 See Chapter 4.2.2, p. 34, on how the VC reacts to political crises. 
185 This affirmation is however not easy to prove. Human Rights Watch compiles an online 
list with the impact that international organisations and NGOs have on governments. See 
https://www.hrw.org/impact. While it can be said that they play an important role, it is not 
fully clear if they play an impactful role. See Hoffmann (2014), p. 591, “[…] Belarus, that 
have not yet overcome totalitarianism and are therefore uninterested in the rule of law and 
democratic discourse.”. Belarus is receiving strong condemnation from the CoE regarding 
recent executions of the death penalty, and the process of abolishing this practice seems 
slow, it not inexistent. See Council of Europe Action plan for Belarus 2016-2017, GR-
DEM(2016)20, 13 September 2016. “The abolition of the death penalty in Belarus remains 
the top priority for the CoE, as capital punishment is a major obstacle for Belarus to taking 
steps towards becoming a CoE member state.”. 
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6 Conclusive analysis  
6.1 Building a step forward 
The theoretical framework has shown that the EU and the CoE are influenced 
by the academic development. Many modern academic views on the rule of 
law takes a substantial stand, which is what Europe’s regional organisations 
do as well. Some parts of the EU’s work, such as the rule of law dialogues, 
are solely working on an ad hoc-basis, by incorporating new societal 
challenges as challenges to the rule of law. The VC has since the rule of law 
opinion, started to refer to the opinion as a source of reference for what is 
meant by the rule of law, which could indicate some degree of self-
reference.186 The EU is apparently comfortable on relying upon the VC when 
it comes to determining what is meant by the ‘rule of law’. The VC is 
therefore a sort of source for interpreting the Article 2 TEU. 
In the previous section, ‘best practices’ from both the EC as well as the 
VC have been identified. As already mentioned, the EC frequently legitimises 
its critique via VC opinions.187 The VC has, since the rule of law checklist 
was adopted, started to use the checklist as a source of legitimacy to its 
opinions.188 In this concluding section, some concrete improvements to both 
organisations will be presented. 
As a measure to improve rates of implemented opinions, the VC could 
develop a mechanism for more systematic follow-up, as an addition to what 
exists today during plenary sessions and DH-meetings. This must of course 
be done with precaution in order to not deter member states from approaching 
the VC for advice, as their failure to comply with recommendations would be 
more out in the open, which is also a matter of resources in terms of both time 
and finances. To present follow-up for each opinion during plenary sessions 
would be too time consuming. A more feasible way would be to publish the 
follow-up online, which of course would imply that more financial means 
need to be granted for the VC staff. That publicity implies pressure is 
undoubtable.189 Therefore, the more transparent the monitoring can become, 
the better. The CoE could use more leverage both in respect to the ECtHR 
and its other bodies, such as the VC. However, to introduce financial penalties 
cannot be seen as a realisable. 
As EU scepticism is on the rise, assessments and threats from the EC 
can lead to further polarisation and lead to a deterioration in cooperation. Its 
current means, including the new EU Framework has not yet proven to be 
effective in the sense of achieving adherence to its recommendations. This 
does not necessarily imply that something is not working, but demonstrates a 
broader problem for international organisations – they are only ever as strong 
as the commitment from their member states. Financial penalties could be tied 
                                                
186 However, the checklist was a continuation of the 2011 report, which cited Tom Bingham 
as a source. 
187 See chapter 5.1. 
188 Ibid. 
189 The impact of pressure, however, is more doubtable. 
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closer to rule of law adherence, and perhaps as a final step in the new EU 
Framework, the recommendation stage, as this tool of achieving adherence 
already exists in the EU in relation to Member State implementation of ECJ 
judgements. Granted that member states would accept this procedure, it 
would at least more probable be to actually be activated, than the current ‘last 
resort’ that is Article 7 TEU. The EU could establish a cooperation via the 
new Framework that enables a meeting of experts from the EU with local 
officials, similar to country visits that the VC conducts.  
Both the EU and the VC have only to gain from introducing more rigid 
and unbiased follow-up procedures. It is not unthinkable that an NGO 
comprised of independent experts could take on the work to assess whether 
both VC opinions and EU Framework opinions/recommendations have been 
satisfactorily implemented in a pure technical way.  
The EU applies pressure in rather political manner, while the VC works 
on a more technical basis. A final general thought is that both organisations 
could benefit from moving towards a middle-way, combining both 
approaches for a hopefully more successful adherence to the rule of law. 
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